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Abstract: Wild hogs (Sus scrofa) are an invasive, exotic species that has spread through much

of the United States through anthropogenic means. Many states have laws and regulations
with the intent of preventing the illegal importation, introduction, and establishment of wild
swine populations. However, in many cases, these laws have been ineﬀectual at stopping the
anthropogenic spread of wild swine. To assess the risk for moving wild hogs, we examined
various wild hog-related laws throughout the United States and assessed the potential reward
for their illegal movement of releasing hogs for hunting purposes. We found that ﬁnes ranged
from $0 to $10,000, with the mean minimum ﬁne of $1,085 and a mean maximum ﬁne of
$2,708. The mean cost of a single-day hunting trip was $448; however, this varied widely
among states. In many cases, potential rewards, as demonstrated by the economic utility, for
releasing wild hogs far outweighed the monetary risk from getting caught. States with few or
no wild hogs and weak laws and/or ﬁnes are at a substantial risk for the illegal importation of
wild hogs. To reduce the potential for the spread of wild hogs, agencies should concentrate
on increasing monetary ﬁnes or increasing the perceptions that this illegal activity will be
successfully detected and prosecuted.
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Invasive, exotic species such as wild hogs
(Sus scrofa) have spread across the United
States through anthropogenic means (Mayer
and Brisbin 2008). The initial release of hogs
into the wild as free-ranging food items later
became valuable big game species for hunting.
Some populations were introduced into
captivity for penned hunts, while others were
released on the landscape for a more traditional
hunting experience. The popularity of hunting
hogs has resulted in translocated populations
throughout the United States, especially in
areas with low or no hog populations (Bevins et
al. 2014). To address this, many state laws and
regulations aim to reduce legal importation of
wild swine. Federal regulations also prohibit
the movement of undocumented swine (9 CFR
Part 71.19). However, these laws have often
been ineﬀectual to stop the anthropogenic
spread of wild swine. A continual influx of
illegally imported and released wild hogs will
hamper current eﬀorts at eradication.
Hunting hogs can be an enjoyable activity
1

that leads to an increased desire to hunt. This
activity can become more expensive if hogs are
not present where the hunter lives. Providing
monetary incentives can be a powerful force
that aﬀects the decision-making process to
complete a task (McNeely 1988), but many
people will not complete tasks that are onerous,
diﬃcult, or time consuming. Instead, they will
often seek loopholes or otherwise avoid the
task while still qualifying for the incentive.
This has often occurred when incentives have
been oﬀered to reduce populations of various
nuisance wildlife populations, including wild
hogs (Choquenot et al. 1996, Singleton et al.
2007, Bevins et al. 2014).
There are positive economic incentives for
hunters to go to other states or other parts of
their own state, obtain a small number of hogs,
and release them on or near their property
(Figure 1). Once a population is established,
hunting the hogs can occur any time. As an
incentive, hunters save money by not having
to drive elsewhere to hunt hogs, especially if
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hunting on a frequent basis. Another incentive
is that wild hogs can potentially be used to
increase the value of a hunting lease or expand
the lease from a single season, such as a deer
season, to multiple seasons and multiple
game animals. Local hunters may also use the
opportunity to hunt hogs to establish a forprofit guide service (Bevins et al. 2014).
While most states have wild hogs (Bevins et
al. 2014), many states do not have populations
that are large enough to hunt on a regular basis,
causing hunters to spend large amounts of time
in pursuit of hogs with little return. In some
states, such as Indiana, Ohio, and Illinois, hog
populations are so fragmented that a hunter in
the state may have to drive for hours to a general
location where hogs have been reported.
Hunters also must find a private landowner
willing to allow them access to their property
to hunt hogs; many are not willing to do so
because of potential property damage from
hog hunters. In states where hog populations
are present, but at low levels, hog hunters may
have to go to other states to hunt successfully.
Some hunters and landowners may recognize
the monetary benefits of illegally introducing
hogs to their property for future hunting
opportunities or future profits.
To prevent undesirable behavior from
hunters and landowners, lawmakers often use
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negative incentives to guide behavior (Piliavin
et al. 1986). In many cases, states and federal
agencies have laws and regulations that, at
least at first glance, provide a disincentive to
illegally importing feral hogs. But for laws and
regulations to be an eﬀective deterrent, fines
or other punishment must be high enough
to oﬀset the potential gain from the illegal
activity or to cause substantial financial harm
to the perpetrator (Ehrlich 1972, Rechtschaﬀen
1998, Garoupa 2001). There also has to be a
high perceived risk of getting caught and the
potential for being successfully prosecuted
(Garoupa 2001). Unfortunately, the eﬀect of
laws on the potential to reduce the introduction
of wild hogs has not been examined or
summarized. Therefore, we conducted a utility
analysis for importing and releasing wild hogs,
where utility is defined as the ability of an object
to satisfy a need or want (Piliavin et al. 1986).
When utility is a positive value, it is perceived
by a rational actor (i.e., the person committing
the activity) to be useful. When a utility is
negative, a rational actor would perceive the
object to be useless. The greater the positive
value, the greater the usefulness. To calculate
the utility of illegally importing and releasing
wild hogs, we reviewed and summarized fines
and penalties from various states regarding the
illegal importation and release of wild hogs and

Figure 1. Wild hogs are often introduced into areas for hunting, but can quickly spread to neighboring
lands, such as this farmer’s corn ﬁeld in Lawrence County, Indiana. (Photo courtesy of USDA)
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examined the positive incentives for moving
wild hogs, such as the cost savings from
required travel to another state to legally hunt
hogs. To demonstrate the application of using
functions for estimating the likelihood of illegal
behavior, we modeled the utility of an actor in
Indiana, a state with small, widely dispersed
wild hog populations and a law targeted to
stopping illegal introductions of wild hogs.

Methods
To determine the potential negative
incentives that currently exist to deter someone
from moving wild hogs to new locations,
we examined the laws and policies of state
agencies responsible for managing wild hogs
using Internet resources provided by state
agencies from October 5, 2013 to March 15, 2014.
Specifically, we searched for laws, policies, and
fines that referenced the legality of possessing,
hunting, trapping, transporting, or other
activities regarding wild or feral swine and wild
or feral hogs. In instances where information
could not be obtained on the Internet, we called
wildlife agencies in each state to determine the
information. We recorded the maximum and
minimum fines and jail terms when available.
If minimum fines or jail terms were not listed,
no data were recorded. When no information
on fines or jail terms could be located, these
states were excluded. Because of the multitude
of common names for wild hogs, we also
documented the use of common names used
for free-ranging Sus scrofa.
To determine the value of the positive
incentives for translocating wild hogs, we
recorded the cost of a single-day hog hunt. We
examined Internet websites using a Google
search for businesses oﬀering to guide or
provide hog hunting services for a single-day
hunt, exclusive of lodging, hunting permit fees,
or other expenses to obtain a range of values
to use in the model. We based our sample
selection on the order of information presented
in the search results, terminating the search
once >75% of a page resulted in non-relevant
or repeated results. We excluded results listed
as paid advertisements. Within a given state, all
businesses were included that met this criteria.
When lodging, meals, or other expenses were
included, we subtracted the costs of lodging
listed on the site, or subtracted the costs for

non-hunting observers. If a single-day hunt
exclusive of other expenses could not be
determined, that site was excluded. All prices
were based on current (2015 U.S.$) price lists.
We did not diﬀerentiate between captive and
free-ranging wild hogs or between diﬀerent
prices based on quality of the hog.
To calculate utility of translocating wild hogs,
we used the following Expected Utility formula
from Piliavin et al. (1986):
E(U) = (1 – p) U(y) + p U(y – F)
E(U) = the actor’s expected utility from a
contemplated activity
p = likelihood of being punished in the
activity
y = the anticipated returns (material or
psychological) from the activity
F = the anticipated penalty resulting if the
actor is punished for the activity
For the minimum value of translocating
hogs to a location near the actor’s location,
anticipated returns (y) are a function of the
personal cost savings for having wild hog
hunting near the actor’s home, as opposed to
driving a considerable distance to hunt. Factors
used to calculate the cost savings include the
cost of the hunt (estimated above), cost of
an out-of-state license, cost of getting to the
location, and costs of lodging. We excluded
other costs that would be incurred regardless
of the location of the hunt, such as meals, guns,
and ammunition.
Anticipated penalties (p) are the fines,
potential imprisonment, and the resulting loss
of revenue for time imprisoned estimated from
the data collected above. We determined the
likelihood of being punished (p) as a range of
probabilities because we located no estimates of
the likelihood of being caught and successfully
prosecuted, although the likelihood of getting
caught in a wildlife-related crime has been
described as “slight” compared with other
crimes (Nurse 2013). Eliason (2003) reported on
several studies where deer poaching detection
rates in 3 states were estimated to range from
1.1% to 2.2%. We found no data on the likelihood
of being caught and punished in Indiana for the
importation and release of wild hogs; therefore,
we calculated a range of values from 0.001 to
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states did not explicitly state the
level of the fine but assess them
through the current criminal
code or the judge or justice of the
peace presiding over the case.
Among states, the definition of
a feral or wild hog can vary. We
found that 48% of states based
their definition of a feral or
wild hog on the amount of time
the animal has spent outside of
captivity, while 30% of states
had no specific definition. We
found no information regarding
a definition of wild hogs from
22% of states. Minimum fines
per hog ranged from $0 to
$10,000 with a median fine of
$500 ( = $1,085, SE = $571, n = 17)
and a mode of $1,000. Maximum
fines per hog ranged from $50
to $10,000 with a median fine of
$1,500 ( = $2,708, SE = $576, n =
20) and a mode of $5,000. Years
in jail per hog ranged from 0
Figure 2. Mean cost of single-day hog hunts in 2015 in 15 states as
determined by a search of posted costs on the Internet by companies years to 2 years with a median
and individuals oﬀering wild hog hunts. Cost estimates are for a
of 1 year ( = 0.7 years, SE = 0.2
single-day, single-hog hunt.
years, n = 11; Table 1).
0.25 as an estimate for p.
We found data from 146 diﬀerent companies
We used the national average values for a or individuals from 17 states oﬀering single-day
single-day hunt and an estimate of other costs hogs hunts (Figure 2). Prices of hunts varied
for overnight travel as cost savings for y, and greatly among states but appeared to be highest
the potential penalties as being the average fines (1) where hogs are uncommon; (2) among states
for translocating wild hogs. However, because popular as a tourist destination, such as Hawaii;
utility is site specific (i.e., needs to include or (3) in states such as Tennessee, where hog
estimates of distance traveled for additional hunting has been severely restricted by state
cost savings, and potential loss of income for law. Hunt prices ranged from $150 to $1,500 (
time spent in jail), we also provide an example = $448, SE = 263, n = 146) with a mode of $500.
of a utility calculation as case study for Indiana. There was considerable variation among states,
but low variability within states (Figure 2).
Results
Based on the mean values for the minimum
We found information for penalties related and maximum fines of $500 and $1,000,
to the importation and/or release of wild respectively, and an average cost of a wild hog
hogs on the Internet for 5 states and collected hunt of $500, the likelihood of being punished
additional information from 21 states by would have to be 100% for the minimum fine to
contacting the appropriate biologist or through serve as a deterrent. For the average maximum
returned phone calls, including from 2 states fine of $1,000 to serve as a deterrent, the
with information located on the Internet. We likelihood of being punished would have to be
found legislation from 24 states that limit the 50%. The highest fine reported was $10,000. For
release of hogs. Of those 24 states, each has this fine to serve as a deterrent, the likelihood of
the potential to assess fines as a penalty for being punished would have to be 5%. Because
the illegal release of hogs (Table 1). Several the expected detection rate is low (likely <1%),
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Table 1. Fines and jail time reported by states or located on the Internet regarding the illegal importation and/or release of wild hogs into the environment collected from October 5, 2013 through March
15, 2014. In some cases, a minimum fine was not explicitly reported and was not assumed to be $0,
but rather left blank.
State

Minimum Maximum Jail sentence Other measures
fine (US$) fine (US$)
(years)

Arkansas

1,000

5,000

Colorado

250

1,000

2

Penalties are per hog

Florida
Georgia

Judge sets all fines; no listed minimum
or maximum
1

Hawaii
Idaho

Penalties are per hog (jail term less on
private land)

200

1,000

Typically includes a 3-year loss of
hunting privileges

1,000

1

5,000

1

Penalties are per hog

Illinois

Class A misdemeanor

Indiana

Class D felony

Kentucky

500

Maryland

0

Massachusetts
Mississippi
Missouri

1

Potential loss of hunting privileges
All hogs are considered livestock

50

Non-criminal citation of $50

2,000

5,000

0.013

1

5,000

1

Loss of hunting and fishing privileges
for 1 year
Some have been sentenced for up to
4 years in jail

Montana

1,000

Loss of hunting and fishing privileges

Nebraska

100

Loss of hunting and fishing privileges

New Hampshire

Misdemeanor

New Jersey

New York

1,000

For release of domestic hog

500

2,500

For release of Eurasian hog unknowing:
4th degree criminal oﬀense

1,000

5,000

For release of Eurasian hog knowing:
3rd degree criminal oﬀense

500

1,000

Penalties are per hog; also loss of
hunting privileges for a specified term

North Dakota

5,000

Oklahoma

250

Oregon

250

2,000

0.026
For a misdemeanor charge

1,000
South Carolina
Texas
Wyoming

For a felony charge if tied with a
violation of Lacey Act
500

1

500

10,000

10,000

0.12

Penalties are per hog
Fines set by Justice of the Peace
Penalties are per hog
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the fines would have to be >$50,000 to serve
as an economic deterrent, assuming the total
value for importing and releasing a wild hog is
$500, or the average value of a hunt.
To illustrate the usefulness of a utility model,
it has to be applied in context, and the total
benefits and costs determined. The total costs
associated with a hunt are specific to each
location (i.e., a person in northern Indiana
may have to drive further for a legal hunt than
a person in southern Indiana). The average
income will also vary with location, which can
influence the deterrent eﬀect of incarceration.
To illustrate this, we applied the formula to
estimate the utility of translocating wild hogs
to Indiana, a state with relatively few hogs,
widely dispersed populations across the state,
and a history of illegal introductions. Because
costs vary depending on the home location of
the actor, we estimated the total cost of a singleday hunting trip from Indiana to central Florida,
one of the closest states with large populations
of hogs to hunt, easily located guide services,
and low prices. For our Indiana actor, the total
cost for the hunting trip, including 2 nights
in a moderately priced hotel ($75 per night),
1,800 miles round trip from Lawrence County,
Indiana to central Florida in an average vehicle
($180; 25 miles per gallon at $2.50 per gallon),
and paying for a guide service ($276; Table 1),
would be $531.
In Indiana, a law that could be used to
prosecute individuals who release wild hogs
is the Animals Running At Large (Indiana
Code [IC] 15-17-18-8). Under this law, illegally
releasing hogs would be a class B misdemeanor.
In Indiana, a class B misdemeanor could result
in a fixed term of imprisonment for ≤180 days
and a fine of ≤$1,000 (IC 35-50-3-3). According to
City-Data.com (http://www.city-data.com/city/
Bedford-Indiana.htm), the median household
income in Indiana during 2012 was $33,039.
Adjusting based on 2.8% inflation, the 2015
median household income would be $33,978.
Assuming a 2-income household, an individual
of that household would have a gross income
of $326.71 per week. Assuming that the judge
imposes the maximum fine of $1,000 and the
maximum imprisonment penalty of 180 days,
or 25 weeks of full-time employment, the total
potential penalty would be approximately
$9,167. However, based on past fines imposed
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for wildlife-related crimes, the likelihood of the
maximum fine is low, with the likelihood of the
maximum imprisonment term even lower.
Lawrence County, Indiana has a long history
of wild hog releases (Caudell et al. 2013).
Lawrence County is 1,171 km2. With only 2
game wardens working in the county at any
given time, the likelihood of being caught in the
act of releasing wild hogs is relatively low and
likely near 1%, similar to those for poaching
of white-tailed deer (Odocoilus virgianus)
discussed by Eliason et al. (2003).
Using the Expected Utility formula (Piliavin
et al. 1986) and a 1% chance of detection, the
maximum fine and maximum time in jail would
result in an expected utility from the illegal
importation of wild hogs as $441. If expected
utility is >$0, then there is a positive incentive
for the illegal action. At a 1% detection rate, it
would require a total fine of $53,100 to result
in an economic deterrent. If the detection rate
could be increased to 10%, then a total fine of
$5,310 would result in an expected utility of
$0; therefore, any increase in fines beyond this
amount should result in a deterrent for the
rational economic actor.

Discussion
We found that most states have a variety of
measures in place to reduce the likelihood of
the spread or introduction of wild hogs. Even
states currently without hogs have recognized
that wild hogs are a potential threat and
have laws in place to reduce the likelihood of
introduction. However, in many cases, there are
factors such as rates of detection that are likely
to negate the eﬀects of fines and penalties.
The threat of jail, fines, and loss of hunting
privileges represent negative economic
incentives for moving wild hogs to locations
where there are no wild hogs or where there are
limited populations. However, for the rational
economic actor, the negative incentives have
to be weighed against the potential gain from
importing wild hogs. For the casual, ethical
hunter who is likely a law-abiding citizen, the
threat of legal action may be enough to keep
them within the bounds of most game laws.
But someone who regularly engages in risky
or illegal behavior either (1) weighs the cost
of being caught against the likelihood of being
caught and rationalizes that the potential gains
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outweigh the benefits; (2) incorrectly assesses
the actual risk of getting caught and, therefore,
misinterprets the data; or (3) just does not care
if they get caught or not (Cooter and Ulen 2011).
We also saw a large diversity of fines
associated with the laws regarding wild hogs.
High fines can be an important part of a
deterrent system for preventing illegal activity.
However, fines have to be high enough to serve
as an eﬀective deterrent. Polinsky and Shavell
(1991) discussed that for fines to be an eﬀective
deterrent, they have to be appropriate to the
wealth of the individual committing the crime.
Essentially, Polinsky and Shavell (1991) found
that the greater the income of the individual,
the greater the fine needs to be to serve as a
deterrent. Most current fines will not serve
as a deterrent in many cases when the factors
of the Piliavin et al. (1986) utility function are
considered. For fines to be more eﬀective, fines
or detection rates would need to increase.
Increasing detection rates may mean that
states use task forces or additional personnel
in sting operations; however, this may be cost
prohibitive for many states. Increasing fines or
related penalties, if high enough, may achieve
the same goal while maintaining costs at the
current level.
Garoupa (2001) argued that, ideally, the
optimal fine for a deterrent encompasses the
entire wealth of the individual. But because the
size of fines will be ultimately limited by law,
such as maximum fine sizes for a particular
type of violation, more creative penalties
may be needed. For an individual with little
wealth, the real value they place on an item or
a privilege, such as the privilege to hunt, could
be used to serve as a deterrent when wildlife
laws are broken. Recently, Kentucky revised
its laws regarding the possession and release
of wild hogs (Kentucky Revised Statutes [KRS]
150.186bbb) so that the fines can include the
forfeiture “of his or her right to hunt, fish, trap,
or be licensed as a commercial guide for a period
of 10 years” (KRS 150.990 Penalties). The loss of
hunting privileges has the potential to serve as a
significant deterrent for the importation of wild
hogs because of the value that people place on
hunting. The value of hunting for a particular
individual is unknown but has been estimated
by examining the maximum collectable
revenue and the total benefit value (Martin and
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Gum 1978). However, it is likely that the value
of hunting exceeds the cost of a hunting license
for many people. For some people, hunting
may represent their most valued recreational
activity, and the loss of hunting privileges can
represent an impact to an entire lifestyle.
Based on the Piliavin et al. (1986) utility
function, the likelihood of being punished can
decrease the size of the fine needed to serve
as an eﬀective deterrent. This likelihood is a
combination of the detection rate for the crime
and the likelihood of prosecution. Moreover,
the actor’s perception of being detected can
increase the perception of being detected
for the model. If an actor believes he may be
detected more often than the actual likelihood
of detection based on the number of law
enforcement personnel, it should decrease
his utility (Piliavin et al. 1986, Ehrlich 1972).
Therefore, the use of tip lines and economic
incentives, such as rewards, for reporting
people who transport and release hogs, similar
to the program implemented by the Tennessee
Department of Natural Resources (Coil
2014), may decrease utility. Eﬀective tip lines
combined with rewards increase both the actual
and perceived chance of being caught releasing
wild hogs. Just as fines have to be high enough
to discourage people from breaking the law,
rewards have to be high enough to encourage
people to report neighbors, acquaintances,
and others who break the law. While states
may not have enough funds to provide large
rewards, providing other incentives, such as
lifetime hunting licenses or special hunting
opportunities may be substantial enough to cost
a state little in terms of funds or lost revenue.
Having state biologists, agriculture agents,
and other employees demonstrate vigilance
about the transportation, possession, and
release of wild hogs can also increase both
the perceived and actual chance of detecting
someone engaged in illegal hunting activities.
Increasing the perception of being caught can
magnify the size of the fine. For example, if a
fine is $500, a person has to weigh the eﬀect
of that fine on their personal situation with
the likelihood of getting caught. If $500 is a
significant amount, but if there is little chance
of being seen by a relatively small number of
law enforcement personnel, the person may
decide the risk of getting caught is low and that
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the rewards are large enough to outweigh those
risks. However, if they believe their neighbors,
the person at the gas station, or any passing
state employee would report them, that can
increase their perceived risk of detection and
make them believe it is more likely that they
will lose $500, making them less likely to take
the chance of engaging in the illegal activity
(Cooter and Ulen 2011).
For laws to be successful deterrents, there
must be a high likelihood that they can
be successfully enforced; however, if laws
are ambiguous, enforcing them becomes
diﬃcult. Currently, there is no single, widely
accepted common name for a free-ranging
undomesticated Sus scrofa that populates the
United States. The wild progenitor of some of
the common domestic species is the wild boar
of Europe, Asia, and North Africa (Sus scrofa),
but a variety of common names are used for
the North American free-living species of
hog including feral swine, hog, and pig; wild
swine, hog, and pig; razorback; Eurasian wild
boar; and a myriad of other names. This can
lead to confusion on the part of the general
public, lawmakers, and those attempting to
enforce laws (Gentry et al. 2004). Those who
draft laws and regulations have to be conscious
of the definition of terms used. For instance,
several states have regulations that prohibit
the transportation or capture of feral swine.
Merriam-Webster’s online dictionary (<http://
www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/feral>)
defines the word feral as relating to or
suggestive of a wild beast or not domesticated
or cultivated; however, it also defines feral as
an animal having escaped from domestication
and becomes wild, which is often the definition
that wildlife biologists will use to distinguish
between native wild animals and those
populations that are now wild but originated
in captivity. Therefore, it could be argued
that once a feral animal is in captivity, it is no
longer feral and is a domestic hog rather than a
feral hog. Even if the word feral is specifically
defined in the law, a lawyer may be able to
make a compelling argument. Free-ranging
or wild might be more accurate terms for the
common name because of specific definitions
of wildlife under the law; even if wildlife is in
captivity, it is still wildlife and not domesticated.
Therefore, the name wild American hog might
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be more appropriate. An even clearer definition
would be to use the scientific name for wild
and domestic swine in laws regarding the
management of wild hogs. Gentry et al. (2004)
reported on a recent ruling of the International
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature that
specific epithet of domestic swine should be
Sus domesticus because of the long history of the
use of this name for the domesticated version of
the wild hog species. While this does not assist
with the identification of species, it does make
it easier for lawmakers to draft legislation. The
use of Sus scrofa and Sus domesticus for wild and
domestic swine, respectively, would provide
a more accurate definition to keep the legal
definitions distinct.
During our research, we found that states
have a wide range of laws and policies
regarding the management of wild hogs, and
laws that prohibit hog hunting are probably
one of the most cost-eﬀective disincentives to
the illegal importation of wild hogs. Attempts
at legalized hunting have resulted in the
significant expansion of populations in both
Tennessee and California because this provides
unintended incentives to spread wild hogs to
other parts of a state (Zivin et al. 2000, Bevins et
al. 2014). We hypothesize that the reverse may
true be if all hunting of wild hogs is outlawed
because this type of law accomplishes several
goals. Making it illegal to hunt hogs removes
the incentive for hunters to move hogs to new
areas. It also means that there is no chance that
a hunting industry, such as guide services,
could be established around hog hunting. If the
law goes further to state that it is illegal to hunt
any wild hog or any feral domestic swine, this
can improve the chances for prosecution; the
prosecuting lawyer does not have to prove that
the hog is a particular species or breed because
any hog that is taken during hunting would
be illegal. Anyone caught in possession of a
hog that appears to have been shot during the
course of hunting could be fined. Unfortunately,
there are also incentives other than economics
resulting from the illegal importation of wild
hogs, such as the enjoyment of a new animal
to hunt outside of other hunting seasons or
supplementing existing populations with new
genetics in an eﬀort to improve the population
(Bevins et al. 2014). In addition to the incentives
that hunters obtain from introducing hogs, there
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are psychological incentives associated with encouraging or allowing recreational hunting
criminal behavior, such as thrill seeking (Nurse by non-landowners can contribute to the
2013), or ignoring a law that the perpetrator anthropogenic spread of wild hogs.
believes is unjust (Cooter and Ulen 2011). These
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